Similarly, my discussion on immigration, which is of course worth a whole book on its own, was deliberately liimited to exploring why it is not a ’solution’ to an ageing society as this is a key argument within the discussion about European demography. It was designed to maintain focus rather than be a definitive answer to all immigration/population flow matters.

Anyway, I hope to do further work in the population politics debate and look forward to reading your thoughts on the subject,
Alasdair

Even leaving those effects to one side, I also don’t think you can divorce European demographic change from global demographic change: we already have economic migration as a direct result of that, and that will surely have a huge impact in a world with 9 bn + people. The paper discusses immigration as a prospective “solution” to Europe’s so-called demographic time bomb, but not as a powerful force that we have to understand and prepare for.

I’m gratified by your response regarding intergenerational equity however, and I certainly agree that many models in this field can be hopelessly simplistic.

First, I stand by my point about trying to counter the excessively ‘pessimistic predictions’ of many analysts and politicians in the field. The pamphlet contains plenty of evidence of vastly over the top analyses of the problem, which will invariably lead to bad and illiberal policy. Having followed the debate for a number of years at the European level, I was concerned at some of the simplistic assumptions which were creeping into policy across the continent.

On inter-generational conflict, my aim was really again to tackle some of the absurd hyperbole (Reforms piece on the IPOD generation, for example) on the issue not to deny there are any issues of intergenerational equity to consider. On the specific point about house prices “acting as a contraceptive” (to misquote David Willetts), I would agree that you would expect some link, but the evidence is that it is not very linear. Put simply, the birth rate has ticked up steadily since 2000 even though prices are going through their biggest ever boom. But I accept that I probably overstated the case and this is an area I would like to take a more detailed look at in the future. In my defence it was not meant to a be a key point of the pamphlet.

On the underlying theme of the book - that population growth is a good - I think you misinterpret its message. Much of the pamphlet is devoted to explaining why we can live very happily with population stagnation or even steady decline in Europe. But I do not, pace the optimum population trust, believe we should be attempting to introduce government policies designed to halve our populations. I actually believe that the current birth rates in Europe are a very rational response to prosperity and social freedoms which governments should not be seeking to undermine with policies which either stimulate or curb fertility rates. However, where this is clear evidence that structural policies are forcing women to choose between children and employment - as is the case in some European countries, there are good liberal, economic efficiency and social justice reasons for ending the anomalies. My analysis suggests that any increase in fertility rates would be marginal at best.

As you say, the issue of population growth elsewhere in the world is a matter for another pamphlet. You may regard this as a far more important problem, but this does not mean the European demographic debate is redundant. Certainly the EU regards demographic change, alongside globalisation, climate change and terrorism as one of the main challenges facing Europe in the 21st century. That was my cue for writing.

Alasdair